SWEET SURRENDER is a Spring Into Romance Winner!

Sweet Surrender won first place in the Historical category of San Diego RWA's Spring Into Romance contest! The complete list of winners and finalists is here; congratulations to the other Historical finalists: Mayo M. Lucas, Anna Cowan, and Linda Gilman. Agent Laura Bradford judged the category and she reps some authors I really love (Jenn Bennett, Anne Calhoun, Megan Hart...), so getting props from her felt really good.

She sent back some really lovely comments with my entry - especially this: "I didn't know what to make of the 1st glimpse of the hero...he felt incredibly menacing at first but I found him wonderfully compelling after we discover he is the Earl, not a ruffian....At first I thought I might not like this...it was very startling. Then I decided I really loved it. Nice job!"

The shift from "menacing" to "compelling" is pretty much exactly what I'm going for with the opening to Sweet Surrender (which, yes, seriously needs a new title...), so I'm glad it's working as intended.

The Railroad Bubble

I was doing a bit of research yesterday about railroads, because the hero of my current WIP is investing in one.  The year is 1837, so he's getting in on the game early. I gave Adam his interest in railroads because I wanted to let readers know how wonderfully clever he is.  Railroads seem like a sure bet, don't they?  Every captain of industry from the mid-to-late nineteenth century seemed to have a finger in the railroad pie - or, hey, a whole hand, an arm buried up to the shoulder - and I expect every sentence that begins with "invested in railroads" to end with "and became obscenely wealthy."

Imagine my surprise when I discovered that the real railroad line serving as the model for my hero's imaginary railroad line didn't last very long.  The company that built it went broke and dissolved not long after the rails were laid.  How does that happen?  Railroads are a sure bet!

So I did a little more digging and found out that England had a railroad bubble in the 1840s - peaking in the late 40s - and that a huge number of shareholders who invested in railroad companies lost everything in it.  Not such a sure bet after all...though it must have looked like it.

Well, I'm going to keep my imaginary hero's imaginary railroad, which in my imaginary world will make him obscenely wealthy - even though, in reality, he'd probably have lost a pretty penny.

But this set me to thinking about a romance set before the fall.  There's something inherently tragic about scenes of hope and joy when you know, as a reader, that misery waits around the corner.  I wonder if that's why Belle Epoque romances aren't more popular.  You'd think they would be, because the period is so glittering and romantic.  My theory is that when you finish a romance with a handsome young hero set in 1910, it's hard to believe in the happily-ever-after when, in the back of your mind, you know the story will really end five or ten years later with the hero dead on a battlefield.

 

I'll see you at dawn

More legal mumbo jumbo, this time about dueling. Duels were illegal and, at least in theory, if a combatant killed someone in a duel not only he but the appointed seconds were guilty of murder.  However, from early on the law drew a distinction between duels fought in hot blood and duels fought in cold blood.

A duel fought in hot blood took place on the heels of the offense that provoked the fight; two guys trade a couple of insults and then head right out into the field of combat while they're both still mad.  This kind of duel was called a "chance medley" (sounds so pretty, right?  A chance medley?) and were guilty only of manslaughter, with a maximum penalty of branding on the hand, a fine, and a year's imprisonment (the minimum penalty could be as low as a single day in prison).

A duel fought in cold blood is the kind we see in romance novels most often.  Insults are exchanged, seconds are secured, the combatants meet at the appointed place and time, usually at dawn or dusk of the next day.  If someone dies during such a duel, and the victor is brought to trial, he ought to be convicted of murder - in practice, however, this was hardly ever the case.  Lord Byron killed a man in a duel and was brought to trial, but even though hours elapsed between the time of the insult and the duel itself, Byron claimed that he fought in the heat of his passions and he was only convicted of manslaughter.

One article I read argued that the rules of dueling were designed to prevent injury, and also to make sure that skill didn't give either party to a duel an unfair advantage.  Here's a quote that sums up the reasoning behind this behavior perfectly: "A fair duel was a game of chance that displayed the willingness of both principals to die for their honor, not their skill at inflicting pain or death." (Joanne Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic, quoted in the Allen/Reed article).

Again, for the record, I'm no expert.  Comments, additions, and corrections are welcome.  Below is the standard version of the Code Duello, and after that the sources I found most useful.

Code Duello

(as codified at the Clonmel Summer Assizes of 1777)

Rule 1. The first offense requires the first apology, though the retort may have been more offensive than the insult. Example: A tells B he is impertinent, etc. B retorts that he lies; yet A must make the first apology because he gave the first offense, and then (after one fire) B may explain away the retort by a subsequent apology.

Rule 2. But if the parties would rather fight on, then after two shots each (but in no case before), B may explain first, and A apologize afterward.

N.B. The above rules apply to all cases of offenses in retort not of stronger class than the example.

Rule 3. If a doubt exist who gave the first offense, the decision rests with the seconds; if they won't decide, or can't agree, the matter must proceed to two shots, or to a hit, if the challenger require it.

Rule 4. When the lie direct is the first offense, the aggressor must either beg pardon in express terms; exchange two shots previous to apology; or three shots followed up by explanation; or fire on till a severe hit be received by one party or the other.

Rule 5. As a blow is strictly prohibited under any circumstances among gentlemen, no verbal apology can be received for such an insult. The alternatives, therefore -- the offender handing a cane to the injured party, to be used on his own back, at the same time begging pardon; firing on until one or both are disabled; or exchanging three shots, and then asking pardon without proffer of the cane.

If swords are used, the parties engage until one is well blooded, disabled, or disarmed; or until, after receiving a wound, and blood being drawn, the aggressor begs pardon.

N.B. A disarm is considered the same as a disable. The disarmer may (strictly) break his adversary's sword; but if it be the challenger who is disarmed, it is considered as ungenerous to do so.

In the case the challenged be disarmed and refuses to ask pardon or atone, he must not be killed, as formerly; but the challenger may lay his own sword on the aggressor's shoulder, then break the aggressor's sword and say, "I spare your life!" The challenged can never revive the quarrel -- the challenger may.

Rule 6. If A gives B the lie, and B retorts by a blow (being the two greatest offenses), no reconciliation can take place till after two discharges each, or a severe hit; after which B may beg A's pardon humbly for the blow and then A may explain simply for the lie; because a blow is never allowable, and the offense of the lie, therefore, merges in it. (See preceding rules.)

N.B. Challenges for undivulged causes may be reconciled on the ground, after one shot. An explanation or the slightest hit should be sufficient in such cases, because no personal offense transpired.

Rule 7. But no apology can be received, in any case, after the parties have actually taken ground, without exchange of fires.

Rule 8. In the above case, no challenger is obliged to divulge his cause of challenge (if private) unless required by the challenged so to do before their meeting.

Rule 9. All imputations of cheating at play, races, etc., to be considered equivalent to a blow; but may be reconciled after one shot, on admitting their falsehood and begging pardon publicly.

Rule 10. Any insult to a lady under a gentleman's care or protection to be considered as, by one degree, a greater offense than if given to the gentleman personally, and to be regulated accordingly.

Rule 11. Offenses originating or accruing from the support of ladies' reputations, to be considered as less unjustifiable than any others of the same class, and as admitting of slighter apologies by the aggressor: this to be determined by the circumstances of the case, but always favorable to the lady.

Rule 12. In simple, unpremeditated recontres with the smallsword, or couteau de chasse, the rule is -- first draw, first sheath, unless blood is drawn; then both sheath, and proceed to investigation.

Rule 13. No dumb shooting or firing in the air is admissible in any case. The challenger ought not to have challenged without receiving offense; and the challenged ought, if he gave offense, to have made an apology before he came on the ground; therefore, children's play must be dishonorable on one side or the other, and is accordingly prohibited.

Rule 14. Seconds to be of equal rank in society with the principals they attend, inasmuch as a second may either choose or chance to become a principal, and equality is indispensible.

Rule 15. Challenges are never to be delivered at night, unless the party to be challenged intend leaving the place of offense before morning; for it is desirable to avoid all hot-headed proceedings.

Rule 16. The challenged has the right to choose his own weapon, unless the challenger gives his honor he is no swordsman; after which, however, he can decline any second species of weapon proposed by the challenged.

Rule 17. The challenged chooses his ground; the challenger chooses his distance; the seconds fix the time and terms of firing.

Rule 18. The seconds load in presence of each other, unless they give their mutual honors they have charged smooth and single, which should be held sufficient.

Rule 19. Firing may be regulated -- first by signal; secondly, by word of command; or thirdly, at pleasure -- as may be agreeable to the parties. In the latter case, the parties may fire at their reasonable leisure, but second presents and rests are strictly prohibited.

Rule 20. In all cases a miss-fire is equivalent to a shot, and a snap or non-cock is to be considered as a miss-fire.

Rule 21. Seconds are bound to attempt a reconciliation before the meeting takes place, or after sufficient firing or hits, as specified.

Rule 22. Any wound sufficient to agitate the nerves and necessarily make the hand shake, must end the business for that day.

Rule 23. If the cause of the meeting be of such a nature that no apology or explanation can or will be received, the challenged takes his ground, and calls on the challenger to proceed as he chooses; in such cases, firing at pleasure is the usual practice, but may be varied by agreement.

Rule 24. In slight cases, the second hands his principal but one pistol; but in gross cases, two, holding another case ready charged in reserve.

Rule 25. Where seconds disagree, and resolve to exchange shots themselves, it must be at the same time and at right angles with their principals, thus:

If with swords, side by side, with five paces interval.

My sources:

Allen, Douglas W. and Clyde G. Reed.  "The Duel of Honor: Screening for Unobservable Social Capital," American Law and Economics Review, Spring 2006.

Horder, Jeremy.  "The Duel and the English Law of Homicide," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (volume 12, no 3), Autumn 1992.

For future reference: didn't get my hands on Simpson's "Dandelions on the Field of Honour: Duelling, the Middle Classes, and the Law in Nineteenth Century England" (1988) 9 Criminal Justice History 99, but I want to.

Crime & Punishment in 1838 England

So for the past couple days I have been scurrying around reading legal journals trying to figure out exactly what would have happened at the scene of a crime in 1838 England.  Maybe there was an easier way, but for my own benefit and to save future googlers a little bit of time and effort, I'm going to summarize my findings here. The public prosecutor's office was first established in 1879.  Before that time, if the victim of a crime (it could be anyone, but was generally the victim) wanted to see the perpetrator punished, they had to lodge a complaint and bear all the costs of the trial.  Some major public institutions, like the Mint, the Bank of England, the Treasury and Post Office retained prosecutors to investigate offenses that affected interests of the state.  For the most part, however, it was up to the injured party to seek restitution.

There's another major exception to the rule of private prosecution, which depends on the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies.  Misdemeanors were subject to summary judgment.  That means no trial, no jury, just a quick jaunt to the nearest Justice of the Peace who'd hear the complaint and pass judgment.

Now, it was very difficult to take someone to trial without a victim - without a complainant.  But a constable could apprehend a thief and take him to the JP for summary judgment and that worked just fine.  So for misdemeanors, a private individual didn't always choose to prosecute.  Increasingly over the course of the nineteenth century, law enforcement officials saw to the task.

Felonies were a different matter.  By their very nature they were indictable offenses, and tried before a jury.  Which means that unless a magistrate or constable were present at the scene of a crime, the victim could choose not to prosecute.  It was against the law to agree not to prosecute (i.e., the victim of a crime seeks out the criminal, confronts him, and reaches a private arrangement for restitution), but very common nonetheless.

Alright.  So.  We're at the scene of a crime now.  What does the JP do?

 

If a respectable prosecutor (victim or interested party) swears an oath that they witnessed a crime, the JP is obligated to arrest the accused.  Other than that, however, the JP could do pretty much what he liked.  He could have someone arrested, based on a standard of reasonable suspicion.  He could dismiss an accusation if, upon further investigation, he decided it had no merit.  He could have a suspect arrested or he could release him on bail.

This discretionary aspect evolved over time.  Starting in the 16th century a JP was required to take written depositions from the complainants, witnesses, and suspects, and then to bind the suspects over for trial.  This process only gradually transitioned into an inquiry, at which the JP weighed the evidence and then decided whether or not it was worthwhile to send the accused to trial.  These changes were formalized in the Jervis's Acts in 1848.

The accused could, and increasingly did, choose to have an attorney present when the JP questioned him.  The attorney could advise his client during the interrogation, but under no circumstances was the accused ever to obtain a copy of the written transcript.

The next step after the arrest was the actual indictment.  The prosecutor presented his case before a jury and if the jury came back with a "true bill" then the case would proceed to a full trial.

I'm no expert - I read a few articles and browsed a few books and this is what I came up with.  I'm listing the most useful sources I found below, for anyone who wants to double check or go read what the real authorities have to say.  If anyone reading this has  corrections, additions, or improvements please leave a note in the comments section or email me.

- Beattie, J.M.: Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800.

- Smith, Bruce P. "English Criminal Justice Administration, 1650-1850: A Historiographic Essay," Law and History Review Fall 2007.

- Smith, Bruce P. "The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850," Law and History Review, Spring 2005.

- Smith, Bruce P. "The Emergence of Public Prosecution in London, 1790-1850," Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Winter 2006